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DAVID LANE,
Pro fes sor of the Uni ver sity of Cam bridge, Great Brit ain 
Elites, Classes, and Civil So ci ety in the
Trans for ma tion of State So cial ism1
Ab stract 
The main ex plan a tory vari ables used to an a lyze the trans for ma tion of
state so cial ist so ci et ies are elite cir cu la tion and re newal. It is con tended
that, while the trans for ma tion may be elite-led, trans for ma tion should be 
an a lyzed as a rev o lu tion ary pro cess pro moted by, and fa vor ing, class in -
ter ests. It is hy poth e sized that the trans for ma tion of the post-com mu nist
coun tries has in volved a pro cess in which en dog e nous and ex og e nous
class forces have played a ma jor role. The ab sence of (eco nomic) civil so -
ci ety un der state so cial ism gave rise to a de fi cient as cen dant cap i tal ist
class. View ing cap i tal ism as an in ter na tional sys tem, po lit i cal elites act -
ing in the in ter na tional arena, through an al li ance with ex og e nous elites,
ac ti vated a move to mar kets and pri vat iza tion. In the post-com mu nist pe -
riod, class in equal ity and ten sion have risen. The weak ness of civil so ci -
ety is a con se quence of an un de vel oped in cum bent bour geois class,
which in turn lim its the ef fec tive ness of class rule. The rapid forms of im -
posed eco nomic and po lit i cal change, in volv ing the dis lo ca tion of the so -
cial struc ture, have weak ened the for ma tion of an oppositional class con -
scious ness. The in clu sion of coun ter-elites into the po lit i cal sys tem (the
“elite set tle ment”) en sur ing a form of po lit i cal man age ment re presses
ideo log i cal op po si tion and fur ther lim its the rise of class con scious ness. 
The most pop u lar an a lyt i cal tool to analyze the dy nam ics of so cial
and po lit i cal change from state so cial ism to cap i tal ism has been the elite
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A re port at the ple nary ses sion “The Role of Classes, Elites, and Pub lic in So cial Trans for ma -
tions in Ukraine” (18-19 May 2006, Kyiv, In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the Na tional Acad emy Sci ences
of Ukraine). In Ukrai nian and Rus sian firstly pub lished in the jour nal “Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody,
marketynh”, 2006, ¹ 3, pp. 14–31.
par a digm, which fea tures prom i nently in ac tor-di rected the o ries. The
anal y sis of who drives the pol icy of tran si tion has fo cused on elite be hav -
ior. Rather than fram ing the dis cus sion of so cial change in the con text of
classes and rev o lu tion, “tran si tions” are de picted as the con se quences
of more or less ne go ti ated set tle ments be tween elite ac tors, in volv ing
pacts, agree ments and con sti tu tion mak ing. 
In an ar ti cle fo cused on Rus sia and East ern Eu rope, Kullberg, Higley
and Pakulski claim quite un am big u ously that “the dy nam ics and tra jec -
to ries of po lit i cal change in post-com mu nist coun tries can be ex plained
al most en tirely as a func tion of the struc ture and be hav ior of elites”1.
Elites are gen er ally con sid ered to be ex pres sions of ei ther their own in -
ter ests or those of na tional and eth nic cleav ages which un der pin po lit i -
cal be hav ior2.
“Elite set tle ments” are cru cial to en sure ef fec tive lead er ship of the
trans for ma tion pro cess3. An as sump tion un der ly ing this think ing is
that non-elites, the pub lic, masses (la bor, peas ants, and in tel lec tu als)
are not mo bi lized and they al low elites to ne go ti ate com pro mises. In ter -
est ar tic u la tion must be mod i fied and “ideo log i cal neu tral ity” must be
re al ized on the part of any coun ter-elite. This al lows elites com ing to
agree ment on fun da men tals: on the own er ship of prop erty; on the def i ni -
tion of who con sti tutes the mem ber ship of, and has rights in, a na tion
state; on how so cial and po lit i cal change should take place and on in ter -
na tional al li ances and link ages. Elites then re place classes as mov ers of
the trans for ma tion pro cess4. More over, po lit i cal man age ment by po lit i -
cal elites en sures the ab sence of crit i cal class ide ol ogy as a con se quence
of party for ma tion. Par ties pro mote con sen sus and re press ideological
opposition and, in doing so, suppress the rise of social classes. 
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See: Lachmann R. Agents of Rev o lu tion // Foran J. Theo ris ing Rev o lu tions. — Lon don; New
York, 1997. — P. 78-79. Lachmann sees elite di vi sion in East ern Eu rope (cre at ing de mands for
trans for ma tion) as stem ming from Gorbachev’s pol icy in the USSR. He ig nores di vi sions be fore
this, for in stance in Czecho slo va kia in 1968, in Hun gary in 1956, as well as the in tense di vi sions
within the Pol ish elites long be fore the 1980s.
At cen ter stage is the no tion of a “nomenklatura elite” popularized by
the in flu en tial work of Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Ste phen White1. The
nomenklatura elite is held to de rive its power from the apparat, es sen -
tially lo cated in the pre vi ous Com mu nist Party. These elites per pet u ated
their power in the post-com mu nist pe riod through net works (so cial and
po lit i cal cap i tal) and by con vert ing their ad min is tra tive po si tion into
con trol of cap i tal assets. 
The nomenklatura un der state so cial ism was much wider in scope
than a po lit i cal elite and might be the o rized in terms of a “po lit i cal class”2.
For Mosca, the po lit i cal class re fers to: “all those groups which ex er cise
po lit i cal power or in flu ence and are di rectly en gaged in strug gles for po lit i -
cal lead er ship; ... within the po lit i cal class is a smaller group, the po lit i cal
elite, which com prises those in di vid u als who ac tu ally ex er cise po lit i cal
power in a so ci ety at any given time”3. Mosca al lowed for new elites to arise
and rep re sent so cial in ter ests and join the po lit i cal elite. The po lit i cal elite
is the group that rules on be half of the po lit i cal class.
How ever, the po lit i cal class in the USSR from which evolved the “no -
menklatura elite”, con tained many dif fer ent in ter ests that were con se -
quent on the pro cesses of in dus tri al iza tion and mat u ra tion of the so ci -
ety. These in ter ests had dif fer ent con cep tions of the way in which re form
should pro ceed4. Hence the con cep tu al iza tion of Higley and Pakulski5
de fin ing the state so cial ist rul ing elite in terms of a high level of ideo log i -
cal con sen sus, con flates nom i nal con sen sus with ac tual po lit i cal di vi -
sions. The Gorbachev po lit i cal elite, for ex am ple, had no con sen sus on
the type of econ omy they saw as a re form model; of a sam ple of 116 mem -
bers of the USSR po lit i cal elite (at the level of the Po lit buro and gov ern -
ment min is ters or dep uty min is ters), the larg est group placed first China 
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Bottomore T. Elites and So ci ety. — S.L., 1993. — P. 7.
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I have sub stan ti ated these points em pir i cally else where and only briefly sum ma rized them
here. See: Lane D., Ross C. The Tran si tion from Com mu nism to Cap i tal ism. — N.Y., 1999.
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Higley J., Pakulski J. Elite Trans for ma tion in Cen tral and East ern Eu rope // Aus tra lian Jour nal
of Po lit i cal Sci ence. — 1995. — Vol. 30. — P. 1–29.
(15), fol lowed by Scan di na via (13), then Ger many (12) and the USA (11).
The ma jor ity (66) had no coun try model1. This is not ev i dence of a “con -
sen sual” po lit i cal elite: rather it is one di vided on their im age of the fu ture. 
It can not be de nied that the po lit i cal elite played an im por tant role in
the tran si tion pro cess. The rul ing elite se cured con sent and guided, as
best it could, pol icy to de velop cap i tal ism and polyarchy. 
Po lit i cal elite anal y sis, how ever, is it self sub ject to con sid er able crit i -
cism. A ma jor prob lem is to ex plain why the post-com mu nist re form ist
po lit i cal elites uni ver sally have adopted the ide ol ogy and pol icy of
 markets, pri vate prop erty and com pet i tive party de moc racy. White and
Krysh tanovskaya do not tell us why the “nomenklatura elite” is trans -
formed it self into an as cen dant elite seek ing to change the pa ram e ters of
the sys tem of state so cial ism. Why not pur sue a state-man aged mar ket
sys tem, leav ing own er ship in state cor po ra tions, as in China? A class-
 based ap proach to trans for ma tion, I claim, ex plains why such a move
has oc curred. 
Elites are em bed ded in struc tures of power, and rul ing or power elites
are de pend ent on the sup port of in ter ests which con trol stra te gic sec tors 
and re sources in so ci ety. The elite ap proach, as de vel oped by Higley and
as so ci ates, is more con cerned with the con di tions in which a sta ble elite
con sen sus should emerge as a de ter mi nant of po lit i cal sta bil ity, rather
than an ex pla na tion of why cap i tal ism should be built on the ashes of
state so cial ism. Where then does class anal y sis fit in?
Chal lenges to Class Ex pla na tions of the Tran si tion
In ear lier writ ings in the so cial sci ences, classes were given a prom i -
nent role in the pro cess of tran si tion be tween ma jor forms of so ci ety2. By
the end of the twen ti eth cen tury, such ap proaches, if not com pletely ex tin -
guished, were smol der ing. In so cial and po lit i cal lit er a ture, so cial class,
as a ma jor mover of so cial change was “dead” — both as an ex pla na tion of
trans for ma tion and in the pol i tics of West ern de vel oped coun t ries.
The lack of class anal y sis in the ma jor the o ret i cal ac counts of the
“tran si tion from com mu nism “fol lows” from two main sup po si tions.
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For de tails see: Lane D. Elite Co he sion and Di vi sion: Tran si tion in Rus sia // Higley J. et al.
(eds.). post-com mu nist Elites and De moc racy in East ern Eu rope. — Basingstoke, 1998. — P. 87.
2
Prob a bly the most in flu en tial is: Barrington Moore Jr. So cial Or i gins of Dic ta tor ship and  Demo -
cracy: Lord and Peas ant in the Mak ing of the Mod ern World. — Lon don, 1967. Other writ ers in the
Marx ist tra di tion are Maurice Dobb, Rodney Hilton, and Paul Sweezy.
First, the pe cu liar “class less”1 struc ture of state so cial ism por trayed
both in “to tal i tar ian” and Marx ist ac counts (in clud ing Marx ist-Le nin ist
and crit i cal Marx ist). “Civil so ci ety” con sti tuted by a cap i tal ist sys tem
was ab sent, and this pre cluded the rise of so cial classes as well as po lit i -
cal co or di na tion through par lia ments. Sec ond, is the con ten tion that
class, as a form of iden ti fi ca tion as well as an ex plan a tory con cept, is in -
creas ingly ir rel e vant in post-in dus trial so ci ety. Clearly, there can be no
class-based so cial change if so ci ety is lack ing in so cial classes. 
Within the to tal i tar ian par a digm, which con di tioned much of West ern
writ ing on state so cial ism and its trans for ma tion, the so cial sys tem was
con sid ered to be so cially un dif fer en ti ated and so cio log i cally “class less”.
To tal i tar i an ism ended classes, which were re placed by an un dif fer en ti -
ated mass. Classes, as forms of as so ci a tion, did not ex ist due to the at om -
iza tion of so ci ety. For Rich ard Rose (et al.) “com mu nist rule ... made tra di -
tional so cial struc tural cleav ages of lim ited sig nif i cance”. More over, the
sud den im po si tion of mar ket forces dis rupted the for ma tion of a class
con scious ness. Con se quently, “class sen si bil ity re mains weak”2. 
Writ ers com ing from a Marx ist per spec tive also, iron i cally per haps,
marginalize class in ter ests. Marx ist-Le nin ists re garded So viet-type so -
ci e t ies as class less be cause of the ab sence of pri vate own er ship and the
com pe ti tion of cap i tals; what class struc ture ex isted was es sen tially
“non- an tag o nis tic”. West ern “crit i cal Marx ists”3 de fined the rul ing
group in terms of con trol by the ad min is tra tion; it was bu reau cratic,
rather than eco no mic in char ac ter. Hence bu reau cratic po si tion gave
rise to eco nomic priv i lege but it did not give the right to own er ship of the
means of pro duc tion and the trans mis sion of as sets through fam i lies —
which en sures the re pro duc tion of cap i tal ism4. Many crit ics in West ern
Marx ism fall back into a rul ing elite and mass model. Con se quently,
Elites, Classes, and Civil So ci ety in the Trans for ma tion of State So cial ism
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Ost D. La bor, Class and De moc racy // Crawford B. (ed.). Mar kets, States and De moc racy. —
Boul der, s.a. — P. 182; Rose R., Tikhomirov E., Mishler W. Un der stand ing Multi-Party Choice //
Eu rope-Asia Stud ies. — 1997. — Vol. 49. — P. 807.
3
Trotsky had a sig nif i cant in flu ence on crit i cal think ers, par tic u larly: Trotsky L. The Rev o lu tion
Be trayed. — 1945. — P. 248.
4
Such so ci et ies were not state cap i tal ist be cause they had no classes de fined “by their po si tion
in the so cial sys tem of econ omy and pri mar ily by their re la tion to the means of pro duc tion”. —
Ibid. — P. 248-249.
Marx ists have not been able to ad dress the dy nam ics of the res to ra tion
of cap i tal ism in class terms.
In West ern po lit i cal sci ence and so ci ol ogy, the “de mise of class” as a
form of so cial iden ti fi ca tion is not new1. The de cline of class has been as -
so ci ated with the struc tural changes in the so cial struc ture and the de -
vel op ment of post-in dus trial the o ries of pol i tics. It is claimed that the
ero sion of the pri mary sec tor and the enor mous fall in num bers of work -
ers in mass pro duc tion in dus try led to the de com po si tion of the work ing
class and with it the ba sis of class con scious ness as so ci ated with early
in dus tri al ism. In post-in dus trial so ci ety, its dis tinc tive knowl edge and
tech no log i cal ba sis give rise to a con sumer so ci ety, in which sta tus
groups be come a fo cus of iden ti fi ca tion, and gender, ethnic and regional
concerns become a site of political conflict. 
These ap proaches have also framed and ac cepted the elit ist ap proach 
to trans for ma tion. So cial classes, how ever, need to be de fined and an a -
lyzed in terms of the pe cu liar i ties of state so cial ist so ci ety as well as the
global reach of the dom i nant capitalist class.
Class In ter ests De fined
A so cial class may be de fined as a group of peo ple shar ing the same
life chances, which are de ter mined by their re la tion ship to the mar ket
and prop erty. A so cial class anal y sis of trans for ma tion has to be based
on the in ter ac tion of three class groups: two en dog e nous2 to state so cial -
ism (the ad min is tra tive class and the “ac qui si tion” class) and one ex og e -
nous — the global capitalist class.
The ad min is tra tive class was con sti tuted of peo ple with ex ec u tive
con trol of the means of pro duc tion (eco nomic min is tries and state com -
mit tees, and heads of ma jor en ter prises) and the in sti tu tions of re pro -
duc tion (such as ed u ca tion and sci ence). The re form strat egy of the ad -
min is tra tive class changed over time de pend ing on the po lit i cal pos si bil -
i ties for change. Ini tially, it sup ported a move to a mar ket within state so -
cial ism (sim i lar to the mar ket re form ers in China). One of the most im-
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See Rob ert Nisbet’s es say, writ ten in 1959. (Nisbet R.A. The De cline and Fall of So cial Class //
Pa cific So cio log i cal Re view. — 1959. — Vol. 2. — P. 11–17).
2
An other class group ing was com posed of the mass of the pop u la tion en gaged in man ual and
un skilled non-man ual oc cu pa tions with rel a tively few as sets and means of con trol. They played lit -
tle role in shap ing re form strat egy.
portant im pli ca tions of this po si tion is that the state would con tinue to
own and con trol eco nomic as sets, and would have no in ter est in fur ther -
ing rep re sen ta tive (polyarchic type) in sti tu tions as they would chal lenge
the he ge mony of the state through de mands for in di vid ual prop erty
rights. Co or di na tion would be se cured by the (re newed) state ap pa ra -
tuses and Com mu nist Party led in sti tu tions, op er at ing through lim ited
mar kets. Other mem bers of this class in the pe riod of state so cial ism
shared a la tent rad i cal ism and would sup port op por tu ni ties, if they
arose, for the ex ten sion of ad min is tra tive con trol of the means of pro duc -
tion to pri vate own er ship. They were thus in sup port of the weak en ing of
the So viet state, par tic u larly its cen tral ized form of con trol and plan -
ning. These views were strongly ar tic u lated in Po land and in the other
Cen tral Eu ro pean coun tries. Grzegorz Kolodko, for ex am ple, has shown
that groups within the op po si tion fa vored “re form”, which would lead to
eco nomic de te ri o ra tion “and ul ti mately lead to the end of the so cial ist or -
der”1. It was a la tent as cen dant class. If this class was la tent, which
group then pre cip i tated rad i cal re form?
As noted by Er nest Mandel, So viet-type so ci et ies were bour geois in
the dis tri bu tion of com mod i ties, this led to the rise of what I would de fine 
as an “ac qui si tion class”. This was a so cial class dis tin guished by its ac -
tual and po ten tial in ter est to en hance its po si tion through the ex ploi ta -
tion of in di vid ual “skill as sets” through a mar ket sys tem. Ed u ca tional
qual i fi ca tions and oc cu pa tional skills are the ma jor dis tin guish ing  fea -
tures of this class. 
Mem bers of the “in tel li gen tsia”, as well as skilled work ers, were po ten -
tially priv i leged with re spect to their mar ket po si tion. Un der state so cial -
ism, more over, they were dis ad van taged in that they were de pend ent on
the ad min is tra tive class, which con trolled the mar ket for la bor (i.e. oc -
cu pa tional mo bil ity was not com pet i tive and in come dif fer en tials were
rel a tively nar row and ad min is tra tively de ter mined). The rel a tive equal ity
of in come dis tri bu tion in turn led to the un der de vel op ment of re tail mar -
kets and con sumer so ci ety.
The re form strat egy of the ac qui si tion class was to sup port a change
to a mar ket sys tem, it was less con cerned with privatization of state as -
sets. It was a class which sought to in crease the sig nif i cance of the bour -
geois dis tri bu tion of re sources through strength en ing, ex tend ing and
prof it ing from the mar ket. It sup ported rep re sen ta tive po lit i cal in sti tu -
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Kolodko G.W. From Shock to Ther apy. — Ox ford, 2000. — P. 28. The au thor cryp ti cally calls
this the pol i tics of “the worse, the better”.
tions as forms of co or di na tion and civil so ci ety as a con text for its own
de vel op ment (free dom of in ter na tional travel, plu ral is tic in sti tu tions,
par tic u larly the press), as well as a spring board for launch ing a cri tique
of the ex ist ing or der. 
Gorbachev him self, at least in the early years of re form, was an ad vo -
cate of this po si tion. The greater monetarization of the econ omy, in -
clud ing in cen tives for work, would only have work if there were goods
and ser vices to buy. As a rad i cal eco nomic re former Aganbegyan put it:
“The whole trans for ma tion is di rected to wards ful fill ing the needs of
the con sumer. The re form in prices, fi nanc ing and banks; the shift from 
cen tral sup ply to in dus try; the re turn, in the fu ture to a con vert ible
 ruble; and all tech ni cal ren o va tion and re gen er a tion is di rected to -
wards this aim”1. In the pop u lar con scious ness of the re form move -
ment, there was a Mes si anic form of Cargo Cults — the boat of  capita -
lism would re turn all that was taken away by the com mu nists and was
lack ing un der so cial ism2.
How ever, un der state so cial ism this po ten tially as cen dant class was
un able to ar tic u late an ide ol ogy of cap i tal ism in volv ing pri vat iza tion of
prop erty and a com pre hen sive move to a mar ket sys tem. They were de -
nied the right to or ga nize or ar tic u late a coun ter-ide ol ogy. (Ideo log i cal
change had to be le git i mated at the top by in cum bent elites rather than
in sur gent coun ter-elites). In the early pe riod of tran si tion, the in ter nal
ad min is tra tive and ac qui si tion strata sup ported “the mar ket”, but not a
move to the pri vat iza tion of state-owned as sets. This is clearly il lus -
trated by vot ing of the elites of these groups. In the Su preme So viet of the
Rus sian So viet Federative So cial ist Re pub lic, in July 1990, vot ing on the
“Silayev re forms”, which pro posed the in tro duc tion of a mar ket in Rus -
sia, had the sup port of over 70% of the gov ern ment and party elites, as
well as over 80% of dep u ties who had a pro fes sional or ex ec u tive back -
ground. How ever, when one con sid ers pri vat iza tion, gov ern ment and
party elites were di vided. In De cem ber 1990, the vote on the in tro duc tion 
of pri vate prop erty was de feated, with nearly 70% of the po lit i cal elites
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Aganbegyan A. The Chal lenge: Eco nom ics of Peres troika. — Lon don, 1987.
2
As one mem ber of the Rus sian Duma put it: we should move to a so cial ism like that in Swe den,
Aus tria, Fin land, Nor way, Hol land, Spain, and Can ada (sic!), there work ers were four to five times
better off than in the USSR. (Speech of Ch. Aitmatov // The First Con gress of Peo ple’s Dep u ties of
the USSR: 25 May — 9 June 1989. — Mos cow, 1989. — Vol. 2. — P. 290). I am in debted to Ste -
phen White for find ing the source of this speech for me.
vot ing against it; of the pro fes sional strata, how ever, un der 40% voted
against1. 
As as cen dant classes sup port ing a mar ket sys tem of ex change and
mar ket valorization of la bor they dif fered from Marx’s as cen dant cap i tal -
ist class. They had no pro pen sity to ac cu mu late; and the ad min is tra tive
class was bu reau cratic, rather than en tre pre neur ial in out look. 
One other class in ter est has been sug gested in the lit er a ture as an as -
cen dant class un der state so cial ism: for eign cap i tal. 
The Global Po lit i cal Class
The trans na tional cap i tal ist class had lit tle pres ence in the state so -
cial ist so ci et ies due to the autarchic na ture of its state-owned econ omy.
World sys tem the o rists such as Chase-Dunn2 as well as crit i cal Marx ists 
such as Binns, Cliff and Har man3 have dis cussed the role of the global
econ omy in the USSR, but have not linked this anal y sis to its trans for -
ma tion. 
The role of trans na tional cor po ra tions in the so cial ist coun tries was
rel a tively small, even in Cen tral Eu rope. Di rect for eign in vest ment into
the so cial ist states was very low be fore the mid-1980s4. The growth of
East-West trade agree ments en abled the ex change of li censes and
 designs, co-pro duc tion ven tures (usu ally West ern firms pro vid ing key
com po nents)5. But there were no trans na tional cor po ra tions in the so -
cial ist coun tries. Un til 1975, only five joint ven tures had been es tab -
lished be tween en ter prises in the COMECON coun tries and in the West6. 
Be sides, there were al ready im por tant dif fer ences be tween the so cial ist
coun tries. Po land and Hun gary had small but sig nif i cant West ern in -
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Binns P., Cliff T., Har man C. Rus sia: From Work ers’ State to State Cap i tal ism. — Lon don,
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Ex port of cap i tal was also very low but can not be dis cussed here.
5
For de tails of the 1970s see: Wilczynsky J. The Eco nom ics and Pol i tics of East-West Trade. —
Lon don, 1969. — P. 382-383. See also the dis cus sion in: Gunder F.A. Cri sis: In the World Econ o -
my. — Lon don, 1980. — P. 194–202.
6
Data cited in: So cial ist Coun tries’ En ter prises Abroad: New Trends // CTC Re porter. —
1987. — ¹ 24. — P. 22.
vest ments from the 1970s. Hun gary had eight joint ven tures in 1980,
ris ing to 66 with cap i tal value of 80 mil lion dol lars in 19861. By 1986,
Hun gary had given en ter prises the right, with rel a tively few re stric tions,
to en gage in for eign trade. “The pol icy of pro mot ing joint ven tures in
Hun gary forms an in te gral part of an eco nomic pol icy whose main ob jec -
tives are the fur ther prog ress of eco nomic re form and a fuller in te gra tion
of the na tional econ omy in the world econ omy”2. 
In the USSR, strong con trols were ex er cised over for eign com pa nies,
some (such as Pepsi-Cola and Fiat) were given li censes to pro duce un der
gov ern ment con trol. And there were lim i ta tions on the for eign own ers.
Only in the mid-1980s the gov ern ment did en cour age FDI. Un der Gor -
bachev, lib er al iza tion of trade took place, spe cial ar eas of joint en tre pre -
neur ship were es tab lished and free eco nomic zones were set up though
they were not very suc cess ful3. In 1987, agree ments in prin ci ple had
been reached with 20 for eign firms to set up joint ven tures and 200 pro -
pos als were be ing ex am ined4. Of some 100 ap pli ca tions for for eign di rect 
in vest ment in the So viet Un ion in 1987, only three had been en dorsed5
and the to tal num ber of joint ven tures, even in 1989, was only 23. There -
af ter, as so ci ated with peres troika pol icy, the num bers in creased to 1,572 
in 19906. These, how ever, were rel a tively small and in sub stan tial. The
only large in vest ment ($1 bil lion) was that of Fiat in 1989 for the pro duc -
tion of cars. 
State so cial ist so ci et ies were on the semi-pe riph ery of the cap i tal ist
world sys tem7. The dom i nant West ern cap i tal ist classes were ex cluded
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from the ap pa ra tuses of the state so cial ist so ci et ies (pos si bly ex plain ing
the po lit i cal hos til ity of the he ge monic West ern states led by the USA).
Such in ter na tional com mer cial ac tiv i ties that ex isted were un der the
con trol of the ad min is tra tive state ap pa ra tuses1. Cap i tal ist en ter prises
were sym bolic is lands in a cen trally planned sea. A trans na tional cap i -
tal ist class could not ex ist within the bound aries of the state so cial ist
coun tries. Hence there was no la tent as cen dant in ter na tional cap i tal ist
class here try ing to get out to form a new dom i nant cap i tal ist class. The
im pe tus for change had to come from the out side. The ex changes be -
tween in ter nal po lit i cal and eco nomic elites with global and in ter na -
tional ones were cru cial as po ten tial mov ers of sys temic change. How
then does the state fur ther the in ter ests of the global cap i tal ist class?
The Na tion State and the Global Cap i tal ist Class
In tra di tional Marx ist anal y sis, both the bour geoi sie and the work ing
class are na tional in form and con scious ness. This na tional lo cus of
iden ti fi ca tion cre ates dif fi cul ties in the anal y sis of class as a global
 phenomenon. The usual anal y sis of view ing the cap i tal ist class as
 seuring its na tional in ter ests through the na tion state does not take ac -
count of the dif fer ent con stel la tions of cap i tal ist power in dif fer ent na -
tion states. One might dis tin guish two func tions of the state: in a na -
tional econ omy, it is an ap pa ra tus of cap i tal ist class dom i na tion; in the
world sys tem of states, it se cures the in ter ests of na tional cap i tals. The
pol icy of states then will vary de pend ing on the rel a tive strength of na -
tional or in ter na tional in ter ests2; whether na tional or in ter na tional in -
ter ests prevail.
Turn ing to the state so cial ist so ci et ies, as noted above, de spite some
in roads of trade and com mer cial in ter course with the West (par tic u larly
in Cen tral Eu rope), there was no in ward pen e tra tion of cap i tal. The so -
cial ist states also had in sig nif i cant eco nomic as sets abroad. They were
then, to a con sid er able ex tent, iso lated from the world cap i tal ist sys tem.
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The ex tent of ad min is tra tive con trol of en ter prises with West ern busi ness con tacts var ied be -
tween coun tries. West ern com pa nies, how ever, had no au ton o mous own er ship of as sets in the
state so cial ist coun tries.
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Tur key and France cur rently have a strong na tional fo cus, whereas the United King dom al ways
has had a pow er ful in ter na tional one. Hence in the UK, un like in France, hos tile take overs of Brit -
ish com pa nies are not op posed. In deed, the Brit ish-Amer i can ver sion of cap i tal ism pos i tively en -
cour ages glob al iza tion or in ter na tion al iza tion of com pa nies.
The im pact of the global cap i tal ist class came through the global po lit i cal 
elite, which had a ma jor ef fect on the col lapse and the di rec tion of trans -
for ma tion. The in ter na tional po lit i cal elites were de ci sive back ers, ini -
tially, of the move to po lit i cal (elec toral) and eco nomic mar kets and, later,
to pri vat iza tion. It is im por tant not to con flate the global po lit i cal elites
(the agents of change) with fac tions of the cap i tal ist class hav ing a global
reach.
The in ter na tional he ge mony of the USA has played a cru cial role in
the ex pan sion of cap i tal ism on a world scale. Not only did it sub verted
eco nom i cally and po lit i cally the so cial ist states in the 1980s, but it also
pro vided an im age and an ide ol ogy which has been ir re sist ible to the
masses. In this way an ex ter nal agency pro vided the mass gravitas for a
pop u lar rev o lu tion, ini tially hailed as a “move to the mar ket” and to de -
moc racy. Rather than a global cap i tal ist class op er at ing in the for mer
com mu nist coun tries through in ter me di ar ies giv ing rise to a com pra dor
type of cap i tal ism, po lit i cal al li ances be tween in ter nal po lit i cal elites,
par tic u larly those spon sored by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, and ex -
ter nal mem bers of the global po lit i cal elites (George Bush, Helmut Kohl,
Bill Clinton, Mar ga ret Thatcher) were cru cial agents of change. By global
po lit i cal elite, I mean in ter na tional ac tors who help to shape global eco -
nomic and po lit i cal pol icy1. These in clude the chief ex ec u tives of in ter -
na tional eco nomic and po lit i cal or ga ni za tions (such as the IMF, the CIA), 
lead ing pro fes sion als in non-gov ern ment or ga ni za tions with a global
per spec tive, na tional pol i ti cians and ex ec u tives with a glob al iz ing in -
tent2. Note that here I put for ward, not an eco nomic class in a Marx ist
sense, but a wider con cept of po lit i cal class, as de fined above. Po lit i cal
and eco nomic elites are re spon sive to, but are sep a rate from, the global
cap i tal ist class. 
Sub stan ti at ing an in ter pre ta tion of an in ter na tional “po lit i cal elite
pact” is dif fi cult. Ne go ti a tions are not only un der taken in se cret, but also 
they lack pop u lar le git i macy. My reputational stud ies of the So viet and
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The World Eco nomic Fo rum might be con sid ered the po lit i cal elite of this po lit i cal class. (In
Davos in Jan u ary ev ery year as sem ble the lead ers of the world’s larg est 1,000 glob al ized com pa -
nies and 33 na tional lead ers, of ten in clud ing the Pres i dent of the United States). See internet un -
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Rus sian po lit i cal elites un der Gorbachev1 and Yeltsin2 con firm the per -
ceived in flu ence of the West. With re spect to in ter na tional pol icy, the ex -
ten sion of pri vate own er ship, and the move to the mar ket, mem bers of
Gorbachev’s po lit i cal elite con sid ered that the most im por tant in flu ence
on the lead er ship was a “dem on stra tion ef fect” — “the need to show the
West that Gorbachev was se ri ous about eco nomic re forms”. Out sid ers
were cru cial al lies to Gorbachev. As one of his clos est ad visers (Andrey
Grachev) has put it: “The task of [his for eign pol icy] was not to pro tect the 
USSR from the out side threat and to as sure ... in ter nal sta bil ity but al -
most the op po site: to use re la tions with the out side world as an ad di -
tional in stru ment of in ter nal change. He wished to trans form the West
into his ally in the po lit i cal strug gle against the con ser va tive op po si tion
he was fac ing at home be cause his real po lit i cal front was there”3.
The views of the Yeltsin elite, it is true, showed that the gov ern ment
ex ec u tive mem bers gave lit tle cre dence to the in flu ence of for eign ers,
though the rule-mak ing par lia men tary and party groups did so. A sim i -
lar re sult was found of elite views on those ad vo cat ing the for ma tion of a
dem o cratic and mar ket sys tem: the Yeltsin ex ec u tive strongly de ny ing
West ern in flu ence, but the law-mak ing and po lit i cal party elite stressed
the role of for eign in flu ence4. The Yeltsin gov ern ment elite, of course,
could not pub licly ac knowl edge be ing un der West ern in flu ence. In terms 
of state the ory — of be ing con strained by the global in ter est of cap i tal op -
er at ing through foreign governments. 
If one con ceives of cap i tal ism in an in ter na tional, global per spec tive,
the cap i tal ist rev o lu tion in the post-com mu nist coun tries was ex -
pressed through the in ter na tional po lit i cal elites. More spe cific con di -
tions on the build ing of cap i tal ism and its in clu sion in the global or der
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are to be found in the con di tion al ity re quire ments of the IMF and other
bod ies, such as the Coun cil of Eu rope and the Eu ro pean Un ion. These
had a sig nif i cant and of ten un ac knowl edged ef fect on the in ter nal eco -
nomic and so cial pol i cies of the post-com mu nist coun tries — par tic u -
larly those seek ing mem ber ship of the Eu ro pean Un ion. The im plan ta -
tion of neo-con ser va tive eco nomic pol i cies and po lit i cal polyarchy has
been a ma jor ob jec tive of the he ge monic West ern pow ers. “Eco nomic de -
moc racy”, en vis aged in the Wash ing ton Con sen sus, in volves in di vid ual
rights to pri vate prop erty, pri vat iza tion of en ter prises, de reg u la tion, a
weak non-dis trib u tive state, and an econ omy open to the global mar ket1.
Eu ro pean Agree ments were con cluded be tween the EU and the Cen -
tral and Eastern Eu ro pean Coun tries. As early as De cem ber 1990, the
EU ne go ti ated with Czecho slo va kia, Hun gary and Po land on the con tent
of the Agree ment which was signed in De cem ber 1991. The Agree ments
aimed to reg u lar ize re la tion ships be tween the EU and the Cen tral and
Eastern Eu ro pean coun tries. These Agree ments were fore run ners to the
Acquis Communautaire; they cov ered free trade, fi nan cial and tech ni cal
as sis tance, and en cour aged the de vel op ment of laws com pat i ble with
the sin gle mar ket — par tic u larly state sub si dies, and free dom of com pe -
ti tion. In June 1993 at the Co pen ha gen Coun cil Meet ing, a com mit ment
was made to open ing up mem ber ship by the EU, sub ject to the ful -
fillment of the “Co pen ha gen Cri te ria”. The cod i fi ca tion of these cri te ria
in the 31 chap ters of the EU’s acquis communautaire included:
The ex is tence of a func tion ing mar ket econ omy as well as the ca pac ity 
to cope with com pet i tive pres sure and mar ket forces within the Union; 
The abil ity to take on the ob li ga tions of mem ber ship in clud ing ad her -
ence to the aims of po lit i cal, eco nomic and mon e tary un ion.
The ad min is tra tive and ju di cial struc tures of coun tries in tend ing to
join must be such that “Eu ro pean Com mu nity leg is la tion trans posed
into na tional legislations [can be] im ple mented ef fec tively”2. 
It is here that the global cap i talist class in ter est is most vis i ble as this
pol icy lays down con di tions for the cre ation of cap i tal ism and pre cludes
the de vel op ment of other forms of cap i tal ism, whether it be based on so -
cial de moc racy or corporatism.
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The Pub lic: Sup port and Op po si tion to Trans for ma tion
What then is the level of sup port for the move to cap i tal ism, mar kets
and lib eral de moc racy and what is the prog no sis for fu ture de vel op -
ments? Are the post-com mu nist coun tries likely to move to sta ble West -
ern-type de moc ra cies with well-es tab lished bour geois rul ing classes
and a com pla cent pop u lace, or is there a pos si bil ity of rad i cal coun -
ter-move ments from “the pub lic” against the terms of the imposition of
capitalism? 
The strength or weak ness, sta bil ity or vol a til ity of a cap i tal ist so ci ety
may be an a lyzed in terms of the con cept of civil so ci ety. Civil so ci ety is
dis tin guished by the au ton omy of in ter me di ary groups from the sphere
of state ac tiv ity. It has two ma jor com po nents. First, eco nomic as so ci a -
tions com posed of groups of peo ple own ing pri vate as sets uti lized for
profit through the mar ket backed by a bour geois class1. The sec ond
com po nent are so cial and po lit i cal as so ci a tions in clud ing po lit i cal par -
ties and non-gov ern men tal or ga ni za tions. In the for mer, the eco nomic
area, are to be found the driv ing forces and ma jor sup ports of cap i tal ism
de rived from the pri vate own er ship of cap i tal. The lat ter is a space where
as so ci a tions may de velop, sup port and/or chal lenge the state which is
the le git i mate form of power. On a world scale, a fur ther de vel op ment has
been the in ter na tion al iza tion of civil so ci ety, with eco nomic in sti tu tions
(com pa nies and co or di nat ing bod ies) be com ing global in scale, which
have weak ened the co or di nat ing role of states at the ex pense of in ter na -
tional bodies such as the IMF and international global companies. These 
topics cannot be considered here. 
In both these spheres, civil so ci ety in the post-com mu nist coun tries
is weak. A char ac ter is tic fea ture of tran si tional so ci et ies has been the
fra gil ity of these in ter me di ary groups — both be fore and fol low ing state
so cial ism. As noted in the dis cus sion of classes above, the foot print of
state so cial ism had nei ther a bour geoi sie nor as so ci a tions linked to
mar ket so ci ety. Dem o cratic (or polyarchic) in sti tu tions were not re quired 
to per form eco nomic and po lit i cal co or di na tion, and the for ma tion of
par ties to ar tic u late in ter ests was not nec es sary as co or di na tion was
con ducted within the state ap pa ra tuses. Most post-com mu nist coun -
tries have lacked, in any sig nif i cant pro por tions, the en er giz ing pow ers
of the bour geoi sie. They have lacked ro bust “non-gov ern men tal or ga ni -
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za tions which bring peo ple to gether in com mon cause… or ga ni za tions
that in volve cit i zens in lo cal and mu nic i pal life…”1.
The bour geoi sie is weakly ar tic u lated as an in ter nal class. All the for -
mer state so cial ist so ci et ies lack lev els of ac cu mu la tion com pa ra ble to
the ad vanced Eu ro pean so ci et ies2. In the post-so cial ist coun tries, the
level of do mes tic in vest ment is qual i ta tively lower than in mod ern cap i -
tal ist states: in 2001, for ex am ple, in high in come coun tries, the av er age
level of do mes tic credit to the pri vate sec tor of GDP was 137.4, for low in -
come coun tries it was 24.1, the av er age for the post-so cial ist coun tries
was 21. By com par i son, Ja pan is 190, China 125; only Czechia and
Croatia are near the level of mid dle in come coun tries and 13 post-com -
mu nist coun tries are even be low the lev els of low in come coun tries3. The
lack of a pro pen sity to ac cu mu late is as char ac ter is tic of pre-1917 Rus -
sia as it is of post-So viet Rus sia, where many of the lead ing en tre pre -
neurs and busi ness men come from non-Rus sian eth nic groups; and
even en tre pre neurs, such as Ro man Abramovich, are char ac ter ized by
their con spic u ous spend ing, rather than en tre pre neur ial abil i ties. In
coun tries such as Rus sia and Ukraine, a vi brant form of mod ern cap i tal -
ism has not been cre ated and it may be doubted whether mod ern cap i -
tal ism has been formed at all. The state therefore comes to perform a
developmental role — as it did under state socialism. 
Though so cial net works in state so cial ism were far greater than rec -
og nized in much of the civil so ci ety lit er a ture4, they were to a con sid er -
able ex tent de pend ent on the state — ei ther di rectly or in di rectly. The cre -
ation “from the top” of civil so ci ety, spon sored by mainly West ern in ter -
ests in the post-com mu nist pe riod, has been rel a tively un suc cess ful
and civil so ci ety or ga ni za tions with out for eign do nor sup port have re -
mained frag ile. Transitologists view civil so ci ety as so ci a tions as es sen -
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tially sup port ive of a sta ble dem o cratic so ci ety. They provide inputs and
legitimacy to the democratic process. 
With the ex cep tion of trade un ions, one finds a very low mem ber ship
and par tic i pa tion in civil so ci ety or ga ni za tions in the post-state so cial ist
coun tries. Hu man rights and Third World or ga ni za tions had much lower 
lev els of par tic i pa tion than in West ern coun tries. (See Ta bles 1 and 2).
Ta ble 1
Mem ber ship of Vol un tary As so ci a tions*
Me di ans for coun tries
Trade un ions Po lit i cal par ties
A B A B
Great Brit ain, Ger many, Spain  7.2 1.0 2.5 1.3
New EU mem bers 10.3 2.3 0.4 0.2
post-com mu nist, non-EU mem bers:
Rus sia, Ukraine, Croatia, Belarus 22.1 4.0 0.5 0.3
All for mer state so cial ist so ci et ies 11.3 3.3 0.5 0.2
* A: Which, if any, do you be long to? 
B: Which, if any, are you cur rently do ing un paid vol un tary work for? 
Data show per cent of re spon dents re spond ing pos i tively.
Source: The Eu ro pean Val ues Study: A Third Wave. Source book of the 1999/2000 Eu -
ro pean Val ues Study Sur veys. Loek Halman. Tilburg Uni ver sity. Nd. Ac cessed on Internet
website, Jan. 2005. 
The pe riod of trans for ma tion has been char ac ter ized by win ners and
los ers, which have a clear class ba sis. Nu mer ous stud ies have shown
that classes (mea sured by oc cu pa tional group ings) are sig nif i cantly and
un equally linked to the dis tri bu tion of re sources1. The new prop erty
own ing classes have gained dis pro por tion ately in terms of in come, per -
sonal se cu rity and life chances, while the man ual work ing class and
peas antry have lost. The in tel li gen tsia has had mixed for tunes. There is
a clear class di vide about the de sir abil ity of, and ben e fits from, the rad i -
cal po lit i cal and eco nomic changes which have taken place. Stud ies
have also shown the grow ing rad i cal iza tion and de vel op ment of a con -
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Ev ans G., Mills C. Are there Classes in Post-Com mu nist So ci et ies? A New Ap proach to Iden ti -
fy ing Class Struc ture // So ci ol ogy. — 1999. — Vol. 33. — ¹ 1; Slomczynski K.M., Shabad G.
Struc tural De ter mi nants of Po lit i cal Ex pe ri ence: A Ref u ta tion of the ‘Death of Class’ The sis //
Slomczynski K. So cial Pat terns of Be ing Po lit i cal. — War saw, 2000.
scious ness of class, par tic u larly among the los ers of tran si tion1. This is
not only in the space of the for mer USSR, but also in Cen tral Eu rope.
What is lack ing in these stud ies, how ever, is the role dif fer ent classes
have played in the pro cess of his tor i cal change.
Ta ble 2
Par tic i pa tion in Hu man Rights and Third World As so ci a tions,
and GDP per ca pita. 2002**
Coun try
Hu man Rights & Third 
World As so ci a tions
GDP (PPP) per ca pita,
2002
Rus sia 0.0  7.820
Belarus 0.7  5.330
Ukraine 0.2  4.560
Me di ans for all Eu ro pean
coun tries 0.5 17.655
Me di ans for old EU mem bers 1.9 26.120
Me di ans for new EU mem bers 0.2 10.625
Me di ans for non-EU mem bers 0.2 –
** Key GDP mea sured in thou sand Amer i can dol lars (USD).
Par tic i pa tion in Hu man Rights & Third World or ga ni za tions, per cent of re spon dents
an swer ing pos i tively; cor re la tion with lev els of GDP.
The Pearson cor re la tion co ef fi cient R = 0.634.
Source: Eu ro pean So cial Sur vey; World De vel op ment Re port 2004, pp. 252-253.
Sup port of the re form agenda has been di vided so cially. Mem bers of
the ad min is tra tive class have bene fited; the “ac qui si tion” class, the in -
tel li gen tsia, has had mixed for tunes; there have been im por tant age di vi -
sions. Op po si tion to the re form agenda in the post-com mu nist so ci et ies
has come from the lower so cial strata, from older and lower ed u cated
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Szelenyi I., Fodor E., Hanley E. Left Turn in post-com mu nist Pol i tics: Bring ing Class Back //
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¹ 3. — P. 501–542. The au thors con clude that the as so ci a tion be tween class and party in creased 
dur ing this pe riod. See also: Kutsenko O. Samoidentifikatsii s klassami: proyavlenie obraza
klassovoy struktury postsovetskogo obshchestva // Makeev S. (ed.). Klassovoye obshchestvo.
Teoriya i empiricheskiye realii. — K., 2003.
mem bers of so ci ety. There is lit tle ev i dence of wide-scale pop u larly- ba -
sed class or ga ni za tions — as op posed to the de vel op ing as so ci a tions of
busi ness men and en tre pre neurs. Po lit i cal par ties have been weak, with
in ef fec tive lev els of mem ber ship and shift ing con stit u en cies of sup port.
There have been rel a tively weak pop u lar move ments of pro test. (Many
pro test move ments, such as the col ored rev o lu tions have been fi nanced
and sup ported by ex og e nous or ga ni za tions — sup port ing move ments
for mar ket re form and plu ral ist po lit i cal or ga ni za tion). The weak de vel -
op ment of a cap i tal ist class has also blunted class con scious ness and
op po si tion has iden ti fied more dif fuse ob jects — the state ad min is tra -
tion, au thor ity fig ures, na tional identities. 
Strength en ing civil so ci ety as so ci a tions has been a ma jor con cern of
West ern gov ern ments, pred i cated on a pol icy that a strong civil so ci ety
would pro vide po lit i cal sta bil ity. While there is cer tainly a pos i tive cor re -
la tion be tween the strength of civil so ci ety as so ci a tions and “sta ble de -
moc racy”, civil so ci ety net works can also pro vide the ba sis for so cial
move ments of pro test. They can be in stru ments in the mo bi li za tion of
op po si tion. How ever, in the trans for ma tion lit er a ture lit tle at ten tion is
given to the role of civil so ci ety or ga ni za tions in the rise of move ments op -
posed to plu ral is tic or dem o cratic in sti tu tions with right or left wing ob -
jec tives. Pos si bly, the po lit i cal sta bil ity of the post-so cial ist coun tries
has been due to an elite con sen sus which has not only guided these
coun tries to a mar ket-type so ci ety, but has also neu tral ized ideo log i cal
op po si tion. De spite the high for mal mem ber ship of trade un ions, they are
largely deideologized and economistic in ori en ta tion. In all the for mer
state so cial ist so ci et ies there have been ris ing lev els of ten sion1. There is a
weak gov ern ing and bour geois class, which cre ates con di tions of in sta bil -
ity. By the same to ken, the weak ness of civil so ci ety has pre vented the rise
of coun ter-elites and so cial move ments by the dis pos sessed and oth ers
op posed to the in tro duc tion of the mar ket and pri vate prop erty. 
Con clu sion
The “trans for ma tions” of the for mer state so cial ist so ci et ies in Cen t -
ral and Eastern Eu rope lacked some of the fea tures of clas si cal  re volu -
tions: vi o lence, char is matic lead er ship, ideo log i cal vi sion, and re sis -
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Golovakha and Panina, for ex am ple, have shown the ris ing level of ten sion in Ukraine.
(Golovakha E.I., Panina N.V. Potentsial protesta Ukrainskogo obshchestva // Sotsiologicheskiye
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tance of power hold ers to re moval. While some schol ars of ten char ac ter -
ize the col lapse and tran si tion as a “rev o lu tion”, most re gard the trans -
for ma tion as a sys tem change, ac com pa nied by elite re newal and re -
place ment. It is con tended that the in tro duc tion of mar kets and pri vat -
iza tion of prop erty led to the cre ation of a cap i tal ist sys tem. Un der pin -
ning the tran si tion from state so cial ism were an un de vel oped “ac qui si -
tion” class and an am big u ous ad min is tra tive class, these were la tent as -
cen dant classes. They were ef fec tively con stricted by the po lit i cal en vi -
ron ment of state so cial ism and were un able to ar tic u late an ide ol ogy or
or ga nize po lit i cal op po si tion. Form ing an al li ance with the po lit i cal elites 
of the he ge monic glob al iz ing cap i tal ist class, en dog e nous re form ist po -
lit i cal elites played a ma jor role as agents of change. Cap i tal ism was
formed from above, its ide ol ogy, in sti tu tions and pro cesses were de fined
by trans na tional organizations — though implemented by domestic be -
n e fi cia ries.
The pro cess of trans for ma tion has both strengths and weak nesses.
The weak ness of civil so ci ety, in the form of both eco nomic classes and
so cial and po lit i cal as so ci a tions, en abled a po lit i cal elite pact to oc cur.
The strength of the cap i tal ist class is stron ger in Cen tral Eu rope, in the
new states of the Eu ro pean Un ion. There a cap i tal ist class had stron ger
roots from the pre-So viet pe riod. In the states of the for mer So viet Un ion
(ex cept ing the Bal tic Re pub lics) state so cial ism was stron ger, it had an
in dig e nous rev o lu tion ary base. The elites were more di vided; an elite
“pact” was more dif fi cult to pro cure. Re li ance on ex og e nous po lit i cal
forces to fur ther the rad i cal re forms was nec es sary un der Gorbachev.
The weak ness of civil so ci ety from an eco nomic point of view, en tails a
strong bour geoi sie with a pro pen sity to ac cu mu late cap i tal, and an in -
cho ate po lit i cal con scious ness — it is in ef fec tive as a rul ing class. The
po lit i cal and so cial form of “civil so ci ety” is also de fi cient. This not only
means that the ar tic u la tion of in ter ests to de fend the masses is in ad e -
quate, but also that very weak ness is a form of sta bil ity. While dis sat is -
fac tion with the out comes of trans for ma tion is wide spread, forms of pro -
test or ga ni za tion, in de fense of those who have suf fered, have been in sig -
nif i cant. While the Cen tral Eu ro pean states are po lit i cally an chored in
the Eu ro pean Un ion, those to the East are not; the sup posed “elite com -
pact” is fragile and the underlying dissatisfaction with the outcomes of
transformation may still lead to further systemic change. 
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